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This thesis compares the retention rates of prior and non-prior enlisted naval officers who 
have served 20 years and are eligible to retire, and it finds that prior enlisted officers 
leave the Navy after 20 years of service at a greater rate, 310 percent, than non-prior 
enlisted colleagues. Furthermore, this study tests whether expanding the existing talent 
pool through increased diversification can offset talent leakage among the officer corps. 
The primary source of data is the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
The study uses a cost benefit analysis approach to quantify the opportunity cost 
for an officer leaving the Navy at 20 years of service in lieu of serving 30 years. Based 
off a wide range of financial variables considered, the cost benefit analysis in this study 
finds that prior enlisted naval officers are better off by $211,000 to continue service 
through the 30-year point.  
Several recommendations are made regarding future research and retaining prior 
enlisted officers.  
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................3 
A. DIVERSITY .....................................................................................................3 
B. TWO TYPES OF OFFICERS ........................................................................4 
C. MUSTANG .......................................................................................................4 
D. THE CULTURE OF THE MUSTANG .........................................................5 
E. DOES A PROBLEM EXIST?.........................................................................5 
F. TO STAY OR TO GO .....................................................................................6 
1. Why Are the Prior-Enlisted Officers Leaving?.................................6 
a. Are They Better Off Financially? .............................................7 
b. Is It Because of Non-Monetary Reason? .................................7 
c. Does the Navy Disincentivize Them from Continued 
Service?......................................................................................7 
d. Part of the Navy Manning Plan? ...........................................11 
G. NAVY’S PERSPECTIVE .............................................................................11 
H. TALENT POOLS...........................................................................................12 
I. TALENT LEAKAGE ....................................................................................13 
1. Preventing Talent Leakage ...............................................................13 
a. Promotion ................................................................................13 
b. Longevity Pay Raises ..............................................................14 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................15 
A. FILIP STUDY: IMPROVING THE NAVY’S OFFICER BONUS 
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS...................................................................15 
B. BISE STUDY: THE EFFECT OF PAY SCALE CAPS ON MARINE 
MUSTANG OFFICERS AND RETIREMENT ..........................................16 
C. CLEMENS STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING 
THE RETENTION PLANS OF JUNIOR U.S. NAVY OFFICERS .........17 
D. COUGHLAN, MYUNG, AND GATES: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT 
ALL: PERSONALIZED INCENTIVES IN MILITARY 
COMPENSATION ........................................................................................18 
E. ASTRELLA STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF 
PRIOR-ENLISTED SERVICE ON NAVY OFFICER 
PERFORMANCE ..........................................................................................20 
F. MISHOE STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF PRIOR-
ENLISTED SERVICE ON MIDSHIPMEN PERFORMANCE, 
GRADUATION, AND FLEET RETENTION AT THE U.S. NAVAL 
ACADEMY .....................................................................................................21 
IV. DATA ..........................................................................................................................23 
A. RETENTION RATES OF PRIOR-ENLISTED VERSUS NON-
PRIOR ENLISTED OFFICERS ..................................................................23 
1. There Is One Exception .....................................................................27 
 viii 
B. DISPROPORTION OF NON-PRIOR ENLISTED OFFICERS IN 
HIGHER RANKS ..........................................................................................27 
C. HOW MUCH WOULD IT COST? ..............................................................30 
1. Step One ..............................................................................................30 
2. Step Two .............................................................................................33 
V. MODEL CHAPTER AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS .........................................35 
A. INPUTS ...........................................................................................................35 
1. Inflation ...............................................................................................35 
2. Starting Civilian Pay..........................................................................36 
3. Military Promotion ............................................................................37 
4. Annual Civilian Pay Raises ...............................................................39 
5. Annual Military Pay Raises ..............................................................39 
6. Tax Rates ............................................................................................40 
7. Investments .........................................................................................41 
a. 401(k) .......................................................................................41 
b. TSP ..........................................................................................42 
c. 401K and TSP Returns ...........................................................42 
8. Social Security ....................................................................................43 
9. Life Expectancy ..................................................................................43 
10. Income Requirement for Full-Time Retirement .............................44 
B. LIMITATIONS OF MODEL .......................................................................45 
1. State Income Tax................................................................................46 
2. Federal Income tax ............................................................................46 
3. Is the Model Still Applicable? ...........................................................47 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................47 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................49 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................49 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................50 
1. Determine WHY Prior Enlisted Officers Get Out ..........................50 
2. Extend “E” Pay through All Pay Grades ........................................50 
3. Research Retention Trends Prior to 20-Year Milestone ................50 
4. Target Bonuses to Top Performers, Prior-Enlisted Officers .........51 
5. Raise Pension Benefit Percentage .....................................................51 
APPENDIX A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS...............................................................53 
APPENDIX B. FINANCIAL PLANNING MODEL IN EXCEL ............................55 
APPENDIX C. NAVAL OFFICE PAY GRADES/RANKS ...................................101 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................103 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................107 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Graph of percentage of prior-enlisted versus non-prior enlisted officers 
retained from 1 to 40 years ..............................................................................25 
Figure 2 Graph of percentage change in retention from previous year ..........................26 
Figure 3 Expected promotion path .................................................................................38 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Officer base pay chart (after Defense Finance and Accounting Services, 
n.d.) ....................................................................................................................8 
Table 2 Average promotion opportunity (from Navy Personnel Command, 2012) .......9 
Table 3 Non-prior enlisted expected promotion time table ............................................9 
Table 4 Prior-enlisted expected promotion time table ..................................................10 
Table 5 Percentage of officers who remain on active duty from 1 to 40 years (from 
Murguia, 2013a) ...............................................................................................24 
Table 6 Percentage change in retention from previous year, analyzed from Table 5 
(after Murguia, 2013a) .....................................................................................26 
Table 7 Current active duty officers with non-prior enlisted versus prior-enlisted 
status by pay grade (from Murguia, 2013b).....................................................29 
Table 8 Percentage of prior-enlisted officers by pay grade (after Murguia, 2013b) ....30 
Table 9 Base pay chart highlighting the difference between prior-enlisted officer 
pay versus non-prior enlisted pay (after Defense Finance and Accounting 
Services, n.d.) ...................................................................................................32 
Table 10 Cost to extend “E” designation through all officer pay grades ........................33 
Table 11 Cost of extending “E” designation through all officer pay grades taking 
increased retention into account.......................................................................34 
Table 12 Average promotion opportunity .......................................................................37 
Table 13 Expected promotion .........................................................................................38 
Table 14 Tax brackets (from Nickel, n.d.) ......................................................................40 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1st LT 1st lieutenant 
AVF all volunteer force 
BAH basic allowance for housing 
BAS basic allowance for subsistence 
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 
BM boatswain’s mate 
CBA cost benefit analysis 
COLA cost-of-living adjustment 
DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center 
DoD Department of Defense 
E Pay enlisted pay (for prior enlisted officers) 
F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft a.k.a. Hornet 
FITREP fitness report 
FY fiscal year 
ISO initial service obligation 
MILPERSMAN Military Personnel Manual 
MSO minimum service obligation 
NMI non-monetary incentive 
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense 
PV present value 
RAP Recommendation for Accelerated Promotion 
SEAL sea air land 
SIPP Survey of Income and Program Participation 
STA-21 Seaman to Admiral 21st Century (Officer Commissioning 
Program) 
SWO surface warfare officer 
TSP thrift savings plan 
TVM time value of money 
 
 xiv 
U.S. United States 




I would like to thank my parents, Mitch and Cheryl, and my brother Chad, for 
their love and support over the many years.  
To Professor Eger and Professor Tick, thank you for your time and academic 
guidance in the thesis process, it is greatly appreciated.  
To Captain Bill Byrne, former Chief of Staff to the Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, 
thank you for the mentorship that guided me here.  
Thanks to the United States Navy, for providing me this invaluable opportunity to 
further my education at one of the greatest institutions this country has to offer, the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my late grandfather, Gerry.  
Graham Fletterich 
I would like to thank my lovely wife, Shawna, who continues to hold down the 
homefront, which allows me the opportunity to concentrate on my studies. To my 
beautiful children, thank you for teaching me the true treasures of life. 
I too would like to thank my parents and family for raising me in a loving home 
and their continued support. I would not have been able to accomplish as much as I have 
without the solid foundation that they helped build.  
To my advisors, Professors Eger and Tick, thank you for your time and support 
during this process. 
To the United States Navy, thank you for all the opportunities you have given me 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy Officer Corps faces a lack of diversity among the mid 
and senior ranks. This lack of diversity is a result of junior officers with prior enlisted 
experience opting to leave naval service at 20 years rather than serving for 30 years. 
Diversity in this thesis is defined as varied backgrounds, specifically prior-enlisted and 
non-prior enlisted experience. This thesis focuses on the Navy’s ability to keep prior-
enlisted officers in the Navy past 20 years of service compared to their non-prior enlisted 
colleagues. 
It is commonly agreed that with diversity come gains in certain synergies. Being 
able to have many different people with diverse backgrounds produces the widest variety 
of possible solutions. One of the most brilliant military strategist realized the benefits 
associated with diversity over 2,500 years ago. Sun Tzu stated:  
There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these 
five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more 
than five primary colours, yet in combination they produce more hues than 
can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet 
combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted. (The 
Art of War, n.d.).  
Applying this same concept to military leaders one can say that five different 
people from five different backgrounds will produce more possible solutions to a problem 
than any leader can fully grasp. Even though the leader is not able to fully grasp every 
conceivable solution, it is imperative for him to be aware of all of the possible solutions, 
allowing him to make the best possible decision.  
This thesis examines first the difference in the retention rates between prior-
enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers. The second question is to determine if the prior-
enlisted officers leave the Navy due to better financial compensation in the civilian 
sector. This thesis uses a cost benefit analysis using a personal financial model from the 
prior-enlisted officer viewpoint.  
In the next chapters we will examine the existing literature that is related to this 
topic, analyze the data that was received from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
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related to prior-enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers retention, take an in-depth look at 
the financial planning model that was developed to determine whether the prior-enlisted 
officer is better off financially to stay in the Navy past 20 years, and, based on the results 
of our analysis, formulate recommendations for the Navy to address the lack of diversity 
in the ranks of seniors officers. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The aim of this paper is to analyze retention differences at the 20-year point 
between prior-enlisted officer and non-prior enlisted officers. To determine the effect of 
the retention differences, a few terms and Navy specific idiosyncrasies need to be 
understood. This chapter covers these terms, specifically, diversity, the two different 
types of officers, mustangs, the culture of the mustang, the problem, the decision to leave, 
the Navy’s perspective, talent pools, and talent leakage. 
A. DIVERSITY 
In common vernacular, diversity is generally related to race, ethnic background, 
and gender, but diversity can take on many forms. Diversity and its associated benefits in 
this thesis refer to the latter definition found in a dictionary. According to the Merriam-
Webster dictionary, the word diversity has two definitions:  
1: the condition of having or being composed of differing elements: 
variety; especially: the inclusion of different types of people (as people of 
different races or cultures) in a group or organization <programs intended 
to promote diversity in schools>  
2: an instance of being composed of differing elements or qualities: an 
instance of being diverse <a diversity of opinion> (Merriam-Webster, 
n.d.) 
Race and ethnicity themselves do not exhaust the meaning of diversity. Among 
naval officers, diversity could be categorized in numerous ways, such as by warfare 
community (e.g., surface warfare, naval flight officer, submariner). Two officers who 
attended the same high school and college who serve within the same warfare community 
are likely to have shared experiences. The diversity between these two officers would be 
minimal, which is true for any homogenous group. The result is like thinking and a 
common perspective. To gain the benefits of diversity, people of varying backgrounds 
and experiences are needed (e.g., a heterogeneous group). Enter the case of the Navy 
Mustangs. 
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B. TWO TYPES OF OFFICERS 
Naval Officers can be divided into two categories, those with prior enlisted 
experience, also referred to as Mustangs, and those without (the young 22-year-old fresh 
out of college). The former have a minimum of four years in the enlisted ranks, and often 
upwards of 10 years. Prior enlisted officers bring fleet experience to the table unlike their 
counterparts. The Navy compensates the prior enlisted officers with what is referred to as 
enlisted pay, or “E” pay, for their valuable fleet experience, which can be in excess of 
$700 a month in base pay for a newly minted ensign, according to 2013 pay charts 
(Defense Finance and Accounting Services, n.d.). Prior enlisted officers tend to be 
focused on the Navy as a career, given they have more vested in the Navy and seek to 
fulfill the 20 years of service required to retire.  
Prior enlisted officers differ from non-prior enlisted officers significantly over the 
first several years of service in terms of the value added to their command. Whereas the 
non-prior enlisted officer is figuring out the Navy, which way is fore and which is aft, the 
prior enlisted officer is solving more difficult problems. This difference diminishes 
around the lieutenant commander rank and is reflected in the cessation of “E” pay starting 
at the O-4 pay grade. Despite the absence of “E” pay, the prior enlisted officers’ 
experience remains invaluable. By removing the “E” pay, the Navy disincentivizes their 
continued service; thereby, shrinking the pool from which it can draw talent, which is an 
overall loss for the Navy. 
C. MUSTANG 
Mustang is a term that refers to an officer who has enlisted experience. These 
officers have their own sub-culture within the officer community. Their enlisted 
experiences and the respect they receive from all ranks set them apart from the more 
traditional naval officer, one who graduated high school followed immediately by college 
and officer commissioning. These select officers bring a unique perspective to 
wardrooms that cannot be replicated. Their experiences are potentially lifesaving. 
Imagine a 1st class boatswain’s mate (BM1), with 10 years of service that earns a 
commission. The former BM1 reports to the ship as a newly commissioned officer, an 
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ensign, and surface warfare officer (SWO) in training. The commanding officer learns 
that this officer is a prior BM1, and is thusly assigned as the ship’s 1st lieutenant (1st 
LT), who is responsible for all deck hands. Being an engaged 1st LT, the officer goes out 
on deck to be a safety observer for the upcoming deck evolution and notices that 
something in the deck operation is not quite right, stops the evolution, and corrects the 
issue. If this officer were a traditional officer with no prior-enlisted experience, it is 
possible the flaw would have been missed; not for a lack of competence, but simply 
because of a lack of experience, the evolution would have continued that could have 
resulted in either a material or personnel causality. The officer was able to use years of 
experience in the deck department as an enlisted sailor and apply that knowledge to 
correct the problem. The officer who does not have enlisted experience would likely not 
notice the issue and take action. 
D. THE CULTURE OF THE MUSTANG 
The culture among Mustangs is different from their non-prior enlisted 
counterparts. These prior-enlisted officers have been through many of the same training 
and had many of the same experiences as their sailors, from boot camp to mess duty. The 
language and Navy culture learned through this training process is engrained in the prior-
enlisted officer, which creates a group of officers to which the enlisted community 
believes it can relate.  
E. DOES A PROBLEM EXIST? 
The prior-enlisted officers are leaving at a higher rate than their non-prior enlisted 
counterparts are after 20 years of service. This exodus of specific officer demographic 
leaves a homogenous group of officers in its wake, and thereby, shrinking the Navy’s 
talent pool from which it can promote. In a homogenous group of people, no benefit, or 
synergy, that derives from being diverse, occurs. The resulting group thinks and acts too 
much alike. This phenomenon is disadvantageous in solving complex problems.  
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F. TO STAY OR TO GO 
Whether an officer is prior enlisted or not, the decision needs be made at some 
point whether to stay in or leave military service, and the question of what to do is asked 
multiple times throughout the career. Generally speaking, departure points that are 
specific milestones in a career arise where the option to exit is available. The first 
departure point occurs at the four- to five--year point, and as late as seven years for 
aviators, as the minimum service obligation (MSO) has been met as seen in the Military 
Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) 1301–108 (Navy Personnel Command, 2003). 
Following the initial departure point, several others occur in a given 20-year career that 
follow a successful execution of orders to a command, which range from 18–36 months 
tours. The decision to stay in or get out is personal and rife with pros and cons. A 
constant on the pro side is that 20 years of service guarantees retirement, as well as the 
accompanying pension and benefits. 
For those who stay for 20 years, they must revisit the question of to stay or to go, 
as the military is likely to have additional assignments for them, provided they are not 
forced out due to a lack of performance. This decision point is complicated as one of the 
key “pros,” the pension, is off the table as it is already “locked in.” The only marginal 
benefit at this point is continued employment and an additional 2.5 percent of base pay 
added to the pension for every additional year served. For some, particularly the prior 
enlisted officer, the prospect of retiring from the Navy at 38 years old to start a second 
career is exciting and promising. Ultimately, each service member must weigh the 
situation and determine if a net positive benefit is gained by staying in. 
1. Why Are the Prior-Enlisted Officers Leaving? 
People leave the Navy for a multitude of reasons. Perhaps they are leaving 
because they are better off financially in the civilian sector. Perhaps they are leaving for 
other, non-monetary reason. Perhaps they are leaving because they are actually 
disincentivized to stay in the Navy. To solve the problem of the fleeing prior-enlisted 
officer, the Navy needs to understand the reasons for flight fully. 
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a. Are They Better Off Financially? 
The first of these reasons is that the prior-enlisted officers are better off 
financially to collect their pensions and start a second career. Answering this question is 
complicated by differing opinions. Asking 10 different officers how much better or worse 
off financially they would be if they decided to stay in the Navy past 20 years of service, 
would yield 10 different answers. Some would advocate that they would be better off by 
staying in, while others would say the opposite. The problem is that a well-known tool is 
not available to aid in the decision-making process to determine whether continued 
service is monetarily beneficial. The model developed in this thesis does provide this 
tool. By taking a set of assumptions and applying those figures to information already 
known, a personal financial planning model was designed that determined that the prior-
enlisted officers are better off financially by $211,018, on average, to stay in the Navy for 
30 years versus leaving the Navy after 20 years of service, given a fixed set of variables.  
b. Is It Because of Non-Monetary Reason? 
The second suspected reason for leaving is non-monetary factors. The 
Navy lifestyle, by any measure, is challenging and it takes dedicated men, women, and 
their respective families, to be able to persist. Deployments and household moves, among 
other hardships, wear on service members and their families. One way to eliminate such 
hardships is to leave the Navy and seek alternate employment that meets their personal 
needs. It is difficult for the Navy to compete with the employment alternatives; given 
these hardships are parts of the job. To make any changes in this aspect would require a 
paradigm shift of retention policies and operation tempos, at a risk of mission failure. 
c. Does the Navy Disincentivize Them from Continued Service? 
The last of these reasons for departure is that the Navy inadvertently 
disincentivizes the continued service past 20 years for prior enlisted officers. The Navy 
pay scale has longevity pay raises included in the service member’s pay every two years, 
with some exceptions. These exceptions are called longevity caps and are controls that 
were originally intended to promote an up or out behavior of the service member. An O-3 
does not receive a longevity raise after the sixteenth year of service, as seen in Table 1, 
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which incentivizes the O-3 to either improve, which increases chances of selection for O-
4, or move on to the civilian sector. What this situation does not fully consider is any 
prior enlisted service time, with one exception. If the service member has four years or 
more of enlisted service, then this member is designated an O-1E when commissioned. 
This “E” designation prevents the newly commissioned officer from being penalized for 
enlisted service time and makes it possible to still receive the longevity pay raises. If this 
were not the case, the longevity cap would already cap a sailor with 10 years of enlisted 
service who is selected as a commissioned officer. Since the “E” designation exists, this 
newly commissioned officer receives the longevity pay raises. However, the “E” 
designation disappears after the O-3 rank. The argument is that the more traditional 
commissioned officer and the prior-enlisted officer are equivalents by the O-4 rank, and 
any advantage that the prior-enlisted officer had prior to this point, is gone. In other 
words, the non-prior enlisted officer now has enough experience and time in the Navy to 
become indistinguishable from the prior-enlisted officer. 
 
Table 1 Officer base pay chart (after Defense Finance and Accounting Services, 
n.d.) 
With the disappearance of the “E” designation, the prior-enlisted officer is 
no longer shielded from these longevity caps. To understand the effect of these longevity 
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caps fully, consider two officers, a traditional academy graduate and compare this officer 
to a prior-enlisted officer who has 10 years of enlisted service. The typical career 
progression of these two officers can be determined by using from the average promotion 
opportunity from Navy Personnel Command found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Average promotion opportunity (from Navy Personnel Command, 2012) 
As a result, the non-prior enlisted officers’ promotion path and the prior-
enlisted officers’ path are found Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
  
Table 3 Non-prior enlisted expected promotion time table 
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Table 4 Prior-enlisted expected promotion time table 
Both cases are also outlined in Table 1. The dark grey highlighted figures 
are the expected monthly pays for the academy graduate while the yellow highlighted 
figures are for the prior-enlisted officer. Notice that the longevity caps affect the prior-
enlisted officer three times while the traditional academy graduate is never affected. The 
problem presented is that the prior-enlisted officer is no longer receiving the longevity 
pay raises that a traditional academy graduate counterpart is still receiving. Doctor 
Robbins, a specialist in the organizational behavior realm, stated in his book, “you can’t 
divorce emotions from the workplace” (Robbins & Judge, 2012). The prior-enlisted 
officer might feel that the Navy values the non-prior enlisted officer more as evident by 
longevity pay caps. This feeling might cause the prior-enlisted officer to look for a job in 
the civilian sector after reaching 20 years of service to be able to collect base retirement 
benefits and seek employment in a company that will appreciate the skills obtained in the 
Navy. 
Issuing a salary increase is seen as a reward, whereas the absence of a 
raise is seen as a punishment in an incentive system; therefore, the prior-enlisted officer 
feels punished for having enlisted experience simply because such enlisted time causes 
ineligibility for the longevity pay raises regardless of performance. This ineligibility 
could result in the prior-enlisted officer perceiving that an issue exists with distributive 
justice, “an employees perceived fairness of the amount and allocation of rewards among  
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individuals” (Robbins & Judge, 2012), which causes animosity towards the non-prior 
enlisted counterpart and discontent towards the bureaucracy of the Navy pay system 
itself. 
d. Part of the Navy Manning Plan? 
Perhaps the fleeing prior-enlisted officers are part of the Navy’s manning 
plan. At some point, the Navy needs people to leave, as it is a hierarchical organization 
and not a flat one. As the officers progress to the higher ranks, fewer officers are needed 
to fill those billets. Maybe the Navy seizes the opportunity to have some natural attrition 
at the O-4 ranks by disincentivizing the prior-enlisted officers to stay. By having the “E” 
designation stop at the O-3 rank, some prior-enlisted officers might feel slighted that they 
will no longer receive the longevity pay raises that could create a negative/unjust feeling, 
which motivates them to take their pension and seek civilian employment. This natural 
attrition could prevent the Navy from having too many officers at the O-4 and O-5 ranks. 
If the Navy had over manning at these ranks, it would have to take drastic measures and 
force officers out who were planning on staying in longer. 
G. NAVY’S PERSPECTIVE 
The Navy’s mission in terms of manpower is to match talent to task. The task may 
change, and often does, as the number of ships and aircraft fluctuate, but billets must be 
filled. The requirement seems simple on a macro level; therefore, the Navy retains as 
many officers as required to fill the billets, known as the “needs of the Navy.” 
Surprisingly, this requirement is not always met. It is nearly impossible to know who will 
depart and when they will do it. Both the health of the economy and the relative peace in 
the world are inversely related to retention, both of which are hard to forecast. Evidence 
of the role of the economy in attrition was made evident in a study conducted by Cox (as 
cited in Thompson, 2011), which “analyzed the relationship between attrition and 
enlistment bonuses using 10 a discrete-time hazard model for first-term enlisted. This 
studied reported that cohort accessions for fiscal years 1993 to 1997 had very high 
attrition rates. In this study, the unemployment rate decreased from 6.9 percent in 1993 to 
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5.1 percent in 1997. The change in the economy specifically affected attrition of the Navy 
enlisted service members in the nuclear ratings with six year contracts.” 
Adding to the challenge is trying to keep the right people, given the lack of 
control over compensation tools. As much as the Navy wishes to control its compensation 
packages, Congress legislatively dictates them. Keeping the right people depends largely 
on the talent pool from which they can draw. 
The control the Navy does have comes in the way of bonuses offered to officers 
in specific communities (e.g., the surface warfare officer bonus). The bonuses range from 
$75,000 to $125,000 and are designed to encourage officers to extend their service for an 
additional three to five years. The bonuses are not tied to performance, and therefore, 
have questionable effectiveness in helping match talent to task. An underperforming 
officer who lacks the drive to seek civilian employment is bonus eligible. Without 
specifically targeting bonuses to top performers, it is unclear if the Navy is maximizing 
its investment. 
H. TALENT POOLS 
The Navy faces a unique manpower challenge in that its officers are 100 percent 
“homegrown” and irreplaceable in the civilian labor market. To replace a lieutenant 
commander, the Navy cannot simply hire a headhunter; rather, it must look within its 
own ranks. To maintain 100 percent manning, the pool of candidates must exceed the 
billet openings. For example, a ship’s wardroom numbers 30 officers or more depending 
on the class of ship. To fulfill all these jobs, the Navy requires at least 30 officers within 
the specific pay grades (e.g., one captain to serve as the commanding officer, and eight 
ensigns to serve as division officers). The larger the pool, the more flexibility the Navy 
has in detailing the right people to the right job. The appropriate experience and talent 
characterize the “right” people. This pool is referred to as a “talent pool.” The larger the 
talent pool, the better the Navy is, as more appropriate matches are made between talent 
and task. 
Diversity within a talent pool is of equal importance to the size of the talent pool. 
Diversity means varying the background and experience of officers for the Navy. Prior-
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enlisted officers contribute to this diversity by virtue of their experience. The Navy is a 
very hierarchical organization with a key distinction between officers and enlisted. By 
serving in the enlisted ranks, service members gain a perspective unlike that of a non-
prior enlisted officer. 
I. TALENT LEAKAGE  
As the term implies, talent leakage is the loss of unique abilities within an 
organization for a multitude of reasons. The Navy is not unfamiliar with talent leakage. 
Naval officers are among the most talented professionals in the U.S. workforce who 
handle multiple tasks under stressful circumstances, which makes them extremely 
marketable in the civilian sector. Headhunters seek out their unique talents, which allow 
the former military members to be well compensated in the civilian market. This situation 
is attractive to the service members, and makes them more likely to take flight.  
1. Preventing Talent Leakage 
It is universally agreed upon that talent leakage needs to be stemmed. The adverse 
effects on the Navy are unsustainable. The Navy has a limited control over its existing 
tools to retain talent, but changes can be made. Two factors that seek to mitigate talent 
leakage to an extent are promotions and longevity pay raises, which are largely dependent 
upon time in grade and service, and provide growing compensation. 
a. Promotion 
The Navy is granted a fixed amount of officers in each pay grade by 
Congressional mandate, regardless of community (e.g., SWOs versus aviators). For those 
who decide to stay after the MSO, the promotion schedule is fixed. A lieutenant junior 
grade will promote to lieutenant at four years and serve in that pay grade for a six 
additional years. Similarly, a lieutenant commander and commander will be promoted at 
roughly the 10- and 15-year point, respectively, followed by the attainment of captain at 
roughly the 20-year mark. 
Unlike civilian jobs, the military promotion structure is nearly fixed in 
terms of when promotions occur, which removes any ambiguity, which serves the 
 14 
member well by signaling upward mobility and a predetermined career path. The near 
certainty of knowing exactly when the next pay grade will be obtained is a valued benefit 
of military service by knowing that a promotion in sight, something to work towards. 
b. Longevity Pay Raises 
Pay raises are one benefit that aims to retain service members. Pay raises 
come in two forms, the annual type on the first of each calendar year, and longevity pay 
raises. Longevity pay raises happen every even year of service and compensate service 
members for their growing experience. According to Navy Cyberspace, “Longevity pay 
raises are based on your creditable cumulative service in any and all branches of the 
armed forces* (there are statutory periods when service in a particular component may 
not be counted)” (Navy Cyberspace, n.d.). Service members are eligible for longevity pay 
raises through the maximum of 40 years of service. Compared to annual pay raises that 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An abundance of research has been done on retention in the military, with a 
majority focusing on junior officers. An officer reaching the 20-year point sounds like a 
retention success story, but the fact remains prior-enlisted officers get out at a greater rate 
at the 20-year point and do not stay in to fill more senior positions. Just as much research 
has been done on the best course of action to retain service members, studies examined in 
this review focus on officer retention, the performance of prior-enlisted officers, and how 
best to incentivize continued service. However, the research is lacking in comparison to 
how retention differs between prior-enlisted officers and non-prior enlisted officers, 
particularly at the 20-year point.  
A. FILIP STUDY: IMPROVING THE NAVY’S OFFICER BONUS 
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 
Filip (2006) attempted to determine the reasons naval officers continue service by 
studying the bonus structure with labor market forces as a backdrop. His primary 
question was “How might the bonus structure for naval officers be changed to meet 
recruitment and retention goals, with qualified personnel, while providing Department of 
the Navy with flexibility and cost effectiveness as the military and civilian labor markets 
change?” 
The literature review provided background on existing naval officer compensation 
by detailing pay components, such as base pay, housing allowances, sustenance 
allowances, etc. In addition, he analyzed non-monetary compensation including 
healthcare, services, tax exemptions, and personal satisfaction. He then continued to 
discuss the existing bonus structures for aviators, submariners, and SWOs. 
Filip (2006) used auction theory for his thesis framework and discussed the 
different types of auctions including ascending-bid, descending-bid, first-price sealed bid, 
and second-price sealed bid. Different bidding strategies were analyzed as was the 
application of auctions to the Navy. Implementing auctions into the bonus pay structure is 
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not without consequence, however. Filip (2006) acknowledges that an adverse perception 
could result as some service members would continue service for less compensation. 
Of particular relevance, the thesis examined signaling, which “can be used to 
resolve information asymmetry between an employer and a prospective employee.” 
(Filip, 2006, p. 33) The application of signaling to the Navy is that “in the end, the Navy 
does not know which officers intend to continue service and which intend to separate, 
causing all members to receive equal compensation regardless of one’s personal 
‘reservation price’” (p. 36). 
In conclusion, signaling and auctions can be combined to restructure the Navy 
bonus program and optimize service member needs, as well as those of the Navy. Under 
his proposed restructuring, officers would bid on their contract length and the lowest 
bidder would be assigned that contract. The findings and recommendations are that 
auctions could be used to improve officer signaling, and would, ultimately, be more cost 
effective than the existing bonus structures. 
B. BISE STUDY: THE EFFECT OF PAY SCALE CAPS ON MARINE 
MUSTANG OFFICERS AND RETIREMENT 
In this thesis, Bise (2008) examines the pay scale cap and its effect on Marine 
mustang and retirement. As the author notes, “A Marine Officer with sufficient time in 
service stops receiving longevity pay, and experiences the phenomenon known as pay 
compression”(p. 3). This phenomenon affects officers from the O-3E to O-7 pay grades 
by eliminating any pay raise with the exception of cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). 
Bise (2008) addresses what some of the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are 
within human psychology and discusses military turnover; specifically, the need for the 
Marine Corps to maximize its return on investment. Using comparative descriptive 
statistics, Bise (2008) determined that only 877 out of 15,372 Marine officers remained 
until retirement. Furthermore, only 15 of those officers stayed past 26 years. In addition, 
only two stayed for a full 30 years of service. 
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Bise (2008) found via data examination that prior-enlisted Marine officers do 
behave differently than non-prior enlisted officers, particularly when it came to staying in 
past the MSO. Prior-enlisted officers were more likely to stay in for 20 years than those 
without prior experience. 
The key recommendation of Bise (2008) was to expand the special pay schedule 
(“E” pay) to the O-4 and O-5 pay grades, which resulted in further retention. “By 
eliminating a dissatisfier, the Marine Corps would no longer be promoting field-grade 
officers from a truncated pool of candidates for promotion, and could build a more robust 
officer corps through the retention of quality prior-enlisted Marine Officers” (p. 46). 
C. CLEMENS STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
RETENTION PLANS OF JUNIOR U.S. NAVY OFFICERS 
In this thesis, Clemens (2002) attempts to determine what factors determine 
whether a junior naval officer will continue to serve past the initial service obligation 
(ISO). Of 17 factors examined, nine had a significant role in determining retention. 
Specifically, the “demographic characteristics of family status; the tenure characteristics 
of military rank (O3), and military life expectations; the economic characteristics of the 
transferability of skills gained in the navy over to a good civilian job, and the satisfaction 
with military work values, and military allocation of time” (2002, Abstract, p. v). 
As Clemens (2002) identifies via a study by Bowman in 1995, training a SWO, 
and subsequently, replacing him, cost the Navy $99,093 without factoring in lost 
productivity. In 1998, the sea air land (SEAL) community received 38 resignation letters, 
yet another community that has faced retention problems. The Navy can reduce its cost 
drastically by curbing this behavior.  
Other factors play a large role in whether someone will stay on the job or exit. 
Clemens (2002) points out that race, age, and obtainment of life goals are determining 
factors in retention. If life has become better since joining the Navy, a person would be 




Aside from the easily identifiable factors, “a group of 20 variables were combined, using 
factor analysis to yield the final four composite variables depicting satisfaction with 
military life” (p. 21). Using a multivariate logit model, Clemens (2002) concludes that 
the: 
factors that were found to be significant in explain the retention intentions 
of junior Navy officers with an obligation, were: Military Rank (O2, O3), 
Military Occupation, Family Status, Life expectations, and Factor1, 
satisfaction with military work values, and Factor2, satisfaction with 
military allocation of time. (p. 32)  
The Navy policymakers are concerned with factors over which they have the 
greatest control. One factor over which that they do have control is allowing its members 
to attain the occupation they chose, which resulted in a 13.78 percent increase in 
intending to stay in (p. 36). 
D. COUGHLAN, MYUNG, AND GATES: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: 
PERSONALIZED INCENTIVES IN MILITARY COMPENSATION 
“One size does NOT fit all” when it comes to military compensation according to 
this research. As the compensation system stands currently, roughly 51 percent of 
military service member compensation is cash (basic pay, basic allowance for housing, 
etc.), while 21 percent is non cash (health care, housing, etc.), and the remaining 28 
percent is deferred (retired pay accrual, veterans benefits, etc.). This structure is not 
inherently flawed but service members place their own value on varying parts of 
compensation, in some cases, less value than what it actually cost the Department of 
Defense (DoD). 
The premise of this research lies in the fact that “the per person cost of military 
personnel has grown by 46 percent over the last 10 years” (Harrison & Montgomery, 
2011). Couple this with the size of DoD spending on its personnel and it is “reasonable 
area to look for savings in defense expenditures.” With a desire to cut spending in the 




as to what effect spending cuts would have on an all-volunteer force (AVF). An 
additional factor is the increase in operational tempo and deployments due to recent 
confrontations. 
The problem with the one-size fits all model is that the DoD is not getting the 
most bang for its buck. The existing scheme compensates all service members equally 
without regard for what matters to service members. Coughlan, Myung, and Gates (2002) 
point out a question from then Chief of Naval Personnel, VADM Ferguson (2008) that is 
analogous to the overarching problem, “Why are we giving childcare incentives to an 18 
year old single sailor with no dependents?” Every DoD-offered incentive may not be 
valued equally by each service member, which leaves room for improvement. The 
recommendation made in this research is to change the existing incentive structure to a 
tailored scheme decided by the service member to allow the service member the ability to 
pick the incentive valued the most. The corresponding cost of that incentive may be less 
than the value placed on it by the service member, which may result in a greater return 
for the DoD’s expense. Conversely, if the cost of the incentive exceeds the value placed 
on it by the service member, improving or removing the undervalued incentive may be an 
option. 
The non-monetary incentives that the DoD could offer include geographic 
stability, assignment choice, telecommuting, and sabbatical opportunities. A survey of 
junior SWOs was used as an example to show the value of how each non-monetary 
incentive (NMI) differed based on personal preference. These officers listed homeport 
and billet choice (geographic stability and assignment choice) as the most highly valued 
NMI’s, which cost the Navy nothing, yet are underleveraged as incentives. 
In summary, this research illustrated the potential benefits of a tailored NMI 
scheme. Service members have a personal discount rate (the value they place on varying 
incentives) that is unknown to the DoD. By offering a NMI package, the DoD optimizes 
its cost to benefit matching, which results in greater retention. 
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E. ASTRELLA STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF PRIOR-
ENLISTED SERVICE ON NAVY OFFICER PERFORMANCE 
“This thesis compares commissioned officers who have prior-enlisted service 
with those who have no prior enlisted service on the basis of selected measures of 
performance.” The performance measures used to compare the two different communities 
were recommendation for accelerated promotion (RAP) and whether the officer was 
promoted to lieutenant commander. 
The premise for this study was that too many officers were leaving the Navy to 
seek civilian employment during an economic boom. To counter this, Astrella (1998) 
asserts that the enlisted community may be “fertile ground for growing new officers who 
possess a longer-term commitment” (p. 2). To be an option, the study points out ADM 
Boorda’s implementation of the Seaman to Admiral (STA-21) program that allows 
qualified enlisted personnel to become officers. 
The methodology used in this thesis is based off the Bowman-Mehay officer 
database, which includes the Navy’s promotion history file, fitness report file, and the 
loss file (when and why an officer left active duty) (p. 25). Building on this information, 
the study uses a “multivariate Logit model to account for possible differences in 
promotion to O-4, based on race, gender, marital status, warfare community, college 
selectivity, and year of the promotion board, as well as prior enlisted service.” For 
analyzing RAP, Astrella (1998) used an ordinary least squares regression model. 
This study has some limitations, as Astrella (1998) recognizes, specifically, that 
“some background factors that may be important in explaining promotion outcomes were 
not available in the file.” Additionally, a potential problem with this study that needs to 
be noted is that promotion rates and recommendations for RAP may not necessarily be 
representative of performance. Simply, the study does not account for any potential 
biases that may exist among board members (disproportionately non-prior enlisted 
officers) (i.e., board members seek to promote officers of similar backgrounds as 
themselves). Further research could be done using different performance metrics or more 
metrics that would be better representative of actual performance. Consideration must 
also be given to the fact that promotions only apply to those officers that choose to stay. 
 21 
A high performing prior-enlisted officer who voluntarily leaves the Navy skews the 
study’s comparison. Lastly, the Navy’s performance evaluation tool used for grading its 
officers, also known a fitness report (FITREP), is not without flaws. 
In conclusion, the study found that “prior-enlisted officers are less likely than 
officers without prior service to receive a RAP’d FITREP” (Astrella, 1998, p. 67). In 
terms of promotion, “the prior enlisted officers were less likely to be promoted and the 
results are significant.” The significance, however, is lost, in pre-drawdown years, which 
may speak to separation programs, and incentives that existed at the time. Although the 
findings are unfavorable toward prior-enlisted officers, Astrella (1998) considers it 
possible that other factors are at play. It is common practice to withhold favorable 
FITREPS, RAPS from officers soon leaving the Navy; often, prior-enlisted officers are 
looking to retire around the O-4 promotion point (p. 70). 
F. MISHOE STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF PRIOR-
ENLISTED SERVICE ON MIDSHIPMEN PERFORMANCE, 
GRADUATION, AND FLEET RETENTION AT THE U.S. NAVAL 
ACADEMY 
This study focuses on the performance of prior enlisted midshipman at the United 
States Naval Academy (USNA). Mishoe (2000) hypothesizes that “prior enlisted 
experience provides these midshipmen with values and skills that help them overcome 
perceived academic deficiencies to be successful at the Naval Academy.” To analyze the 
influence on performance, linear and non-linear LOGIT regression models are used based 
on admissions data. 
Looking at previous studies regarding USNA performance, it has been concluded 
that military enculturation (coming from a military family) plays a significant role in 
academy success. By this reasoning, Mishoe (2000) suggests that prior enlisted 
midshipman should also perform well given their military background. Other factors as 
well play into USNA performance, which is why the whole-man multiple is used in 
granting admission. The whole-man multiple looks at an individual’s well roundedness 
rather than focusing on any one metric (e.g., SAT score or GPA). A person’s character 
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and involvement in community or athletics contributes to a midshipman’s motivation and 
ability to handle the rigors of the USNA. 
In conclusion, Mishoe (2000) found that “the results of this study that in addition 
to the variables in the candidate multiple, prior enlisted experience also has a positive 
effect on performance and graduation” (p. 77). Moreover, “the prior enlisted explanatory 
variable predicted higher rates of success than any of the components of the Candidate 
Multiple.” Success at the academy was not the entire significant finding of this study. It 




A. RETENTION RATES OF PRIOR-ENLISTED VERSUS NON-PRIOR 
ENLISTED OFFICERS 
Data from DMDC help determine whether prior-enlisted officers leave the Navy 
at a higher rate than non-prior enlisted officers after 20 years of service. Working closely 
with a data analysis from DMDC, Jennifer Murguia, the following officer cohort study of 
officers who became commissioned between fiscal year (FY) 1985–FY 1989 was 
received as shown in Table 5 (Murguia, 2013a). 
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Percentage of Officers who Remain on Active Duty from 1 to 40 Years
for those Individuals who became Commissioned Naval Officers between FY 1985-FY 1989
Data as of: September 30, 2012
Source: Officer Cohort File
N % N % N % N %
0 25,299 100.0 3,875 100.0 2,481 100.0 31,655 100.0
1 25,299 100.0 3,875 100.0 2,222 89.6 31,396 99.2
2 25,073 99.1 3,875 100.0 2,013 81.1 30,961 97.8
3 24,549 97.0 3,875 100.0 1,864 75.1 30,288 95.7
4 24,112 95.3 3,875 100.0 1,752 70.6 29,739 93.9
5 22,326 88.2 3,875 100.0 1301 52.4 27,502 86.9
6 19,706 77.9 3,874 100.0 858 34.6 24,438 77.2
7 17,046 67.4 3,868 99.8 652 26.3 21,566 68.1
8 14,849 58.7 3,857 99.5 525 21.2 19,231 60.8
9 12,722 50.3 3,824 98.7 427 17.2 16,973 53.6
10 10,589 41.9 3,766 97.2 360 14.5 14,715 46.5
11 9,058 35.8 3,703 95.6 314 12.7 13,075 41.3
12 7,740 30.6 3,622 93.5 284 11.4 11,646 36.8
13 6,634 26.2 3,545 91.5 233 9.4 10,412 32.9
14 6,195 24.5 3,472 89.6 204 8.2 9,871 31.2
15 5,851 23.1 3,414 88.1 176 7.1 9,441 29.8
16 5,683 22.5 3,351 86.5 159 6.4 9,193 29.0
17 5,640 22.3 3,258 84.1 136 5.5 9,034 28.5
18 5,628 22.2 3,190 82.3 125 5.0 8,943 28.3
19 5,620 22.2 3,113 80.3 105 4.2 8,838 27.9
20 5,598 22.1 3,033 78.3 79 3.2 8,710 27.5
21 3,608 14.3 2,726 70.3 67 2.7 6,401 20.2
22 3,192 12.6 2,128 54.9 38 1.5 5,358 16.9
23 2,857 11.3 1,796 46.3 24 1.0 4,677 14.8
24 2,184 8.6 1,492 38.5 20 0.8 3,696 11.7
25 1583 6.3 1,243 32.1 14 0.6 2,840 9.0
26 1057 4.2 1052 27.1 8 0.3 2,117 6.7
27 514 2.0 889 22.9 5 0.2 1408 4.4
28 117 0.5 736 19.0 4 0.2 857 2.7
29 39 0.2 598 15.4 4 0.2 641 2.0
30 11 0.0 468 12.1 4 0.2 483 1.5
31 3 0.0 291 7.5 2 0.1 296 0.9
32 0 0.0 225 5.8 0 0.0 225 0.7
33 0 0.0 176 4.5 0 0.0 176 0.6
34 0 0.0 129 3.3 0 0.0 129 0.4
35 0 0.0 87 2.2 0 0.0 87 0.3
36 0 0.0 50 1.3 0 0.0 50 0.2
37 0 0.0 26 0.7 0 0.0 26 0.1
38 0 0.0 14 0.4 0 0.0 14 0.0
39 0 0.0 6 0.2 0 0.0 6 0.0





Table 5 Percentage of officers who remain on active duty from 1 to 40 years (from 
Murguia, 2013a)  
See the corresponding graph in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Graph of percentage of prior-enlisted versus non-prior enlisted officers 
retained from 1 to 40 years 
It is evident by the graph in Figure 1 that prior-enlisted officers do indeed retire at 
a greater rate at the 20 year of service mark. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the story that the tails of the data tell is not of 
interest. Only the time frame between 20 and 30 years of service is of interest. With that 
in mind, analyzing the data with a more critical eye on the specified time frame reveals 
the following (the portion of the table in white is the original table from DMDC and the 
yellow highlighted portion of the table is an analysis of the data). 
 26 
NON-PRIOR PRIOR
N % N %
20 5,598 22.1 3,033 78.3 -0.087 -2.065
21 3,608 14.3 2,726 70.3 -7.866 -7.923
22 3,192 12.6 2,128 54.9 -1.644 -15.432
23 2,857 11.3 1,796 46.3 -1.324 -8.568
24 2,184 8.6 1,492 38.5 -2.660 -7.845
25 1583 6.3 1,243 32.1 -2.376 -6.426
26 1057 4.2 1052 27.1 -2.079 -4.929
27 514 2.0 889 22.9 -2.146 -4.206
28 117 0.5 736 19.0 -1.569 -3.948
29 39 0.2 598 15.4 -0.308 -3.561
30 11 0.0 468 12.1 -0.111 -3.355






Table 6 Percentage change in retention from previous year, analyzed from Table 5 
(after Murguia, 2013a) 
The graphic display tells an even more compelling story, as seen in Figure 2. Not 
only does a difference in the retention rates of prior-enlisted and non-prior enlisted 
officers occur, but it is significantly different as well. 
 
Figure 2 Graph of percentage change in retention from previous year 
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1. There Is One Exception 
The twenty-first year of service is the only year that percentage change in 
retention is similar for both prior-enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers. One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is the retirement pay structure. People who retire from 
the military are given a retirement rate based on their pay over the last three years of 
service. If they were promoted to a higher pay grade at their eighteenth year of service, 
they would be compensated with a pension that incorporates the average of two years at 
the higher pay grade and one year at their previous, lower pay grade. Another possible 
explanation for the twenty-first year of service to be similar in retention rates between 
prior-enlisted and non-prior enlisted officers could be explained by obligated service 
requirements of a new duty station. Moving military members and their families is 
expensive. Officers are typically transferred every two to four years. If officers desire to 
be rotated to a new duty station at their nineteenth year of service, the Navy usually 
requires them to obligate another two years of service. The result of requiring the service 
member to obligate is to spread moving costs over the two years. 
Regardless of the reason why retention rates between the prior-enlisted officer 
and the non-prior enlisted officer are roughly the same in the twenty-first year of service, 
when considering the 10-year span as a whole, it is clear that prior-enlisted officers leave 
at a higher rate after 20 years than the non-prior enlisted officers. 
B. DISPROPORTION OF NON-PRIOR ENLISTED OFFICERS IN HIGHER 
RANKS  
Another issue was discovered upon receiving and analyzing the data from DMDC 
as seen Table 7. A disparity appears between the proportion of prior-enlisted officers in 
the O-6 to O-10 pay grades. This disparity is an issue because the O-6 to O-10 ranks are 
considered the policy-making ranks of the Navy. Prior-enlisted officers comprise nearly 
23 percent of the officer corps, yet they only make up 15 percent, seven percent, and less 
than one percent of commanders, captains, and flag officers, respectively (Murguia, 
2013b). This discovery is not too surprising when considering the amount of time prior-
enlisted officers spend in the enlisted community, and the amount of time it takes for an 
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officer to move up through the ranks; however, it is disconcerting that the policy-making 




Current Active Duty Officers with Non-Prior Enlisted versus Prior Enlisted Status by Pay Grade 
Data as of: June 30, 2013
Source: Active Duty Personnel Master file
PAY GRADE NON-PRIOR ENLISTED
PRIOR 
ENLISTED UNKNOWN TOTAL
O01 5,018 881 571 6,470
O02 4,962 1,464 236 6,662
O03 13,260 5,347 421 19,028
O04 7,374 3,149 10 10,533
O05 5,564 999 4 6,567
O06 2,950 211 0 3,161
O07 114 1 0 115
O08 63 1 0 64
O09 41 0 1 42
O10 10 0 0 10
UNKNOWN 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 39,357 12,053 1,243 52,653
Produced by the Defense Manpower Data Center on August 19, 2013
DRS #65929
*Prior-enlisted status is generated using the Active Federal Military Service Base Calendar Date (Military Base Date) and the Active Federal Military Officer Service Base 
Calendar Date (Officer Base Date). If the Officer Base Date is unknown, then the Prior Enlisted Status is "UNKNOWN."  If both the Military Base Date and the Officer 
Base Date are known, and if the Military Base Date is at least 4 years earlier (1,461 days or more) than the Officer Base Date, then the officers are given a status of 
"PRIOR ENLISTED," otherwise the officers are given a status of "NON-PRIOR ENLISTED." Note: the Military Base Date and the Officer Base Date may have been 
adjusted for breaks in service and lost time.
 
Table 7 Current active duty officers with non-prior enlisted versus prior-enlisted status by pay grade (from Murguia, 2013b) 
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Current Active Duty Officers with Non-Prior Enlisted versus Prior Enlisted Status by Pay Grade 
Data as of: June 30, 2013
Source: Active Duty Personnel Master file
PAY GRADE NON-PRIOR ENLISTED
PRIOR 
ENLISTED % PRIOR
O01 5,018 881 13.62%
O02 4,962 1,464 21.98%
O03 13,260 5,347 28.10%
O04 7,374 3,149 29.90%
O05 5,564 999 15.21%
O06 2,950 211 6.68%
O07 114 1 0.87%
O08 63 1 1.56%
O09 41 0 0.00%
O10 10 0 0.00%
UNKNOWN 1 0 0.00%
TOTAL 39,357 12,053 22.89%  
Table 8 Percentage of prior-enlisted officers by pay grade (after Murguia, 2013b) 
C. HOW MUCH WOULD IT COST? 
How much would it cost the Navy if it were interested in eliminating the early pay 
scale caps for the prior-enlisted officers by extending the E designation through all the 
ranks, in hopes of increasing prior-enlisted officers? The costs associated with such a 
decision can be determined by using a combination of the data received by DMDC and 
the Navy’s pay scale found on the Defense Finance Accounting System (DFAS) website, 
found in Table 8 and Table 9 (Defense Finance and Accounting Services, n.d.).The first 
step in determining the cost would be to calculate how much extra the O-1E through O-
3E would receive compared to their non-prior enlisted officers colleagues. The second 
step would be to combine what is learned from step one with the total amount of prior-
enlisted officers in the ranks that currently do not receive the E designation, O-4 through 
O-10, which protects them from the early longevity pay caps. 
1. Step One 
Determine how much extra O-1E through O-3E pay grades receive compared to 
their non-prior enlisted officers colleagues with the same amount of years served. This 
determination is accomplished by comparing the green highlighted numbers to the yellow 
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highlighted numbers seen in Table 9. This comparison will yield that the average pay 
difference between the non-prior enlisted officers and the prior-enlisted officers is about 




Table 9 Base pay chart highlighting the difference between prior-enlisted officer pay versus non-prior enlisted pay (after Defense 
Finance and Accounting Services, n.d.) 
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2. Step Two 
Combine the additional $442 a month that the O-1E through O-3E pay grades 
earn and apply that figure to the rest of the prior-enlisted officer corps that currently do 
not receive the “E” pay scale designation. The result of this effort shows that it would 
cost the Navy just over $23,000,000 annually to extend the E designation to all officer 
ranks that meet the “prior-enlisted” criteria; the computational work is shown in Table 
10. 
Pay Grade Over 6 Over 8 Over 10 Over 12 Over 14 Over 16 Over 18
O-3 6,240.00$ 6,240.00$ 6,240.00$ 
O-2 4,586.40$ 4,586.40$            4,586.40$ 4,586.40$ 
O-1 3,619.20$            3,619.20$ 3,619.20$            3,619.20$ 3,619.20$ 
O-3E 6,332.10$ 6,470.70$ 6,659.40$ 
O-2E 4,732.50$ 4,978.80$            5,169.30$ 5,311.20$ 
O-1E 3,864.60$            4,007.70$ 4,153.80$            4,297.20$ 4,493.70$ 
Difference
O-3E 92.10$       230.70$     419.40$     
O-2E 146.10$     392.40$                582.90$     724.80$     
O-1E 245.40$                388.50$     534.60$                678.00$     874.50$     







Average Pay Difference 
Between E and Non (per 
month per prior-enlisted) 442.45$                
Annual Cost 23,154,293.40$   
Table 10 Cost to extend “E” designation through all officer pay grades 
These numbers would be for the first year of implementation. If this strategy 
increases retention in the prior-enlisted ranks, the cost would also rise. A sensitivity 
analysis shows how much this strategy would cost if it succeeds in increasing retention of 




Table 11 Cost of extending “E” designation through all officer pay grades taking 
increased retention into account 
 35 
V. MODEL CHAPTER AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Everyone has their own opinion as to whether an officer is better off staying in the 
Navy past 20 years of service or getting out and pursuing a civilian job. It seems that if 
10 people are asked the same question, five will say that they are better off staying in 
while the other five say they are better off by getting out. Imagine being that individual 
who is trying to make the decision at the 20-year mark, whether to stay in longer or 
become a civilian. No online calculator exists to help them make an informed decision. 
That lack of an online calculator was the basis for this financial planning model. It was 
designed to help these officers make a better-informed decision at their 20-year mark; 
however, it can also be used to determine if these prior-enlisted officers are better off 
financially in the civilian sector or staying in past 20 years. This model could also help 
explain why these prior-enlisted officers leave the Navy if the model returns that they are 
better off financially by leaving.  
A. INPUTS 
The model takes many different inputs into consideration and provides a value in 
today’s dollars for it to determine correctly whether it is in the best interest for a prior-
enlisted naval officer to retire at the 20-year service point or stay in for another 10 years 
to max out retirement. The inputs for the model are: inflation, starting salary for someone 
with a Master’s degree, civilian pay raises, military pay raises, average return on a 401k 
plan, employer matching the 401k plan, personal contribution of salary to the 401k plan, 
social security, total amount saved by the service member by the twentieth year of 
service, percentage of pay to Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) from service year 20 to 30, 
income tax rate, life expectancy, and expected promotion for the prior-enlisted officer 
from the twentieth service year to the thirtieth service year.  
1. Inflation 
Inflation is inevitable; therefore, to make the model as real as possible, it is 
included. Since inflation is always changing and unpredictable, the model uses the same 
average annual inflation rate of 3.24 percent since 1913 that is stated on the inflation 
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website, inflationdata.com (McMahon, 2013). This inflation rate is applied in two 
different locations in the model. The first time inflation affects the model is through 
future cash flows. All the cash flows are taken for every year and then adjusted by the 
inflation factor to account for time value of money (TVM). The second effect that 
inflation has on the model is through social security payments. A starting social security 
payment from the retirement planning website is $14,500 per year (The Calculator Site, 
n.d.), but that figure is adjusted as time passes; therefore, the starting social security 
payment at age 62 was taken and a TVM multiple applied to it for the corresponding year 
(i.e., $14,500 * 1.03242 for the first year, age 63, after the original payment). By 
applying TVM to both future cash flows and social security payments, it is then possible 
to understand fully how much the decision costs the service member in today’s dollars, 
not in 2059 dollars. 
If the model assumes increased inflation, the opportunity cost associated with 
leaving the military after 20 years increases; conversely, if the inflation variable is 
decreased, the opportunity cost falls. As inflation goes up, the discount rate rises, which 
has a larger negative impact on all future cash flows. Since the inflation rate is also tied to 
social security payments in this model, in the form of a TVM multiple, it has the opposite 
effect. As the inflation rate rises, the social security payments increases; however, this 
effect is negated through discounting the social security payment cash flows back to 
present time using the increased discount rate. 
2. Starting Civilian Pay  
When service members leave the military, they can expect to find employment 
with pay appropriate for their education level and experience. Based on data received 
from DMDC, over half (58 percent) of the prior-enlisted officers who have reached 
typical retirement pay grades (O-4/O-5) have an education level of a Master’s degree or 
higher (Murguia, 2013b). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the median 
wage of an individual with a Master’s degree is $1,300 a week, which equates to $67,600 
a year (United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stastistic, 2013). Of course, 
this number is a generalized figure and it is hoped that a retired naval officer with 20 
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years of experience would be able to command a higher salary; regardless, it was decided 
to use this figure as the starting salary for this model. A sensitivity analysis can be found 
in Appendix A with different starting civilian salaries and the present value (PV) of the 
decision to leave at 20 years.  
If the starting civilian salary of a recently retired naval officer is increased, 
retiring from the service at 20 years becomes more attractive. The amount of increase 
needed for the service member to become indifferent to the decision of staying in the 
service or retiring is $1,864 a week or $96,928 a year. 
3. Military Promotion 
If the service members stay in the Navy, they can assume that they will still 
achieve promotion commensurate with their years in pay grade and that their peers 
achieve. Using Table 12 from The Navy Personnel Command, it is possible to determine 
what the typical career progression of the 10-year prior-enlisted officer would be; the 
result appears in Table 13 (Navy Personnel Command, 2012). 
 
Table 12 Average promotion opportunity 
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Table 13 Expected promotion 
With these two pieces of information, it is then possible to plot the prior-enlisted 
officers’ progression through the pay grades on a pay chart, which is seen in Figure 3. 
The expected promotion path is highlighted in yellow. 
 
Figure 3 Expected promotion path 
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This assumption, promotion rate, cannot be changed in the model. If it could, it 
would be expected that retiring from the service at the 30-year point becomes even more 
attractive if the promotion rates increase; conversely, if the promotion rates decrease, the 
civilian employment opportunity becomes more attractive. 
4. Annual Civilian Pay Raises 
The private sector understands how important annual raises are to retain talent and 
to prevent flight. Due to this understanding, on average, the private sector gives out 
annual pay raises that outpace inflation. According to USMILITARY.COM, the largest 
pay raise from the years 1976 through 2009 occurred in 1981 and 1982. The raise for 
those two years was 9.1 percent. On average however, the raise for these 33 years was 
4.656 percent. Based on this evidence, 4.656 percent was used as the annual civilian pay 
raise (Powers, 2009). 
If it is assumed that the civilian annual pay raises are going to be higher than the 
33-year average of 4.656 percent, the difference between retiring at the 20-year mark and 
staying in for the full 30 years becomes smaller. For instance, if the 4.656 percent annual 
raise is increased to five percent, the difference in today’s dollars changes to $180,689 (a 
difference of $30,329). The service member is still better off monetarily by over 
$180,000 by choosing to stay in the Navy. The higher the annual civilian pay raise, the 
more attractive the option of retiring at 20 years and seeking civilian employment will be. 
This situation is especially true if the service member can lock in a civilian annual raise 
of 6.64 percent; the point at which the service member compares the two options, staying 
in the service for 30 years or retiring from military service at 20 years, and becomes 
indifferent (monetarily speaking) to the choice. 
5. Annual Military Pay Raises 
The military also understands how important annual raises are to retain talent and 
to prevent flight. Historically, the military has compensated their employees comparable 
to the civilian sector. Over the same 33-year span as mentioned previously, the military 
has had an average of 4.544 percent compared to the civilian sector 4.656 percent. To 
obtain pay information for future years, a retirement calculator from Office of the 
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Secretary of Defense (Office of Secretary of Defense, Militay Compensation, n.d.) was 
used. The online calculator has a fixed rate of four percent per year for military raises. 
This percentage, unfortunately, creates a slight disconnect between the model and reality; 
it was necessary to use an annual raise in the amount of four percent rather than the 4.544 
percent the past 33-years’ worth of data provides. 
The service members would be better off financially if they decide to stay to the 
30-year point if the military annual raise increases, but by how much? If the four percent 
annual military pay raise is changed to the 4.544 percent, this model returns a figure of 
$226,875, a difference of $15,857. Even if the military were to issue a 0 percent annual 
pay raise, the service member would still be better off by $101,463 to continue service to 
their 30-year point. 
6. Tax Rates 
Income determines the individual income tax rates in the United States. It would 
be inaccurate to determine if the service member would be better off financially by 
staying in the service or seeking civilian employment at their 20-year mark without 
taking this the tax rates into consideration. To determine the appropriate tax rates to use, 
Forbes.com was consulted and the following tax brackets used in this model: 
 
Table 14 Tax brackets (from Nickel, n.d.) 
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7. Investments 
a. 401(k)  
Civilian corporations typically offer 401(k) plans to their employees; 
therefore, this perk must be included in the calculation to determine if the service 
member is better off in the civilian sector. Two key factors need to be addressed. The first 
is how much does the employee contribute. The second is how much does the employer 
contribute. According to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the 
employee contribution rate of earnings has a mean of 8.0 percent and the median is 5.7 
percent. Meanwhile, the employer contributes a mean of 4.6 percent with a median of 3.0 
percent (Porterba, Venti & Wise, 2010). Companies “match” their employees’ 
contribution in differing ways. “Matching.” is basically comprised of two different parts. 
The employers match up to a certain percentage of the employees’ contribution and then 
they apply a specific rate to that figure. Typical rates that the company applies to the 
contribution is defined by Hilery Simpson (2010) of the BLS as the following. 
Approximately 53 percent of employers match their employees’ contribution at a rate of 
$0.50 or less per $1 contributed, while 36 percent match their employees’ contribution 
100 percent, and nine percent match at a rate of $0.51 to $0.99 per dollar. She further 
stated that 41 percent of employers match up to six percent of their employees’ 
contribution while 10 percent match at a rate greater than six percent. Even with some 
401k plans, affectionately referred to as “Cadillac plans,” the employer matches 100 
percent of what the employees contribute. These last plans are rare (Simpson, 2010). 
Using the information just provided, it was decided to split the difference of employee 
contribution median and mean to arrive at a rate of seven percent. It was also decided to 
use a flat figure of 3.92 percent for the employer contribution in this model. This 3.92 
percent figure is not too far removed from MSN Money’s figure of 4.1 percent in 2011 
(MSN Money, 2012).  
The civilian employment option makes some gains on continued military 
service through the matching portion of the 401(k) variable. The higher the rate that the 
civilian employer matches the employees’ contribution, the more attractive the civilian 
option will be. To have an indifference point on the 401K variable, both the service 
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member and the employer would have to contribute more than 12.4 percent of the 
employees’ pay to the 401K. This scenario is extremely unlikely. 
b. TSP 
TSP is basically the military’s equivalent to the civilian 401(k). It allows 
service members to make tax-free contributions throughout their service and then draw 
on the funds after they retire from their second career at a lower tax rate. Meanwhile, they 
can collect gains and interest off their funds, which the TSP reinvests. Due to the nature 
of the TSP program, the contribution rate is treated the same as a 401(k) plan (seven 
percent). 
c. 401K and TSP Returns 
According to The Motley Fool, a company that dedicates itself to 
improving the knowledge of the individual investors, investment choices in a 401(k) plan 
vary with different amount of risks and rewards associated with each. These choices are 
likely to be the following. 
• Money market funds 
• Low risks and low rewards (four percent per year) 
• Stable value accounts (guaranteed investment contracts or bank deposit 
accounts) 
• Low risks and low rewards (four percent per year) 
• Bond mutual funds 
• Risks vary between very safe and somewhat risky with mediocre returns 
(four to eight percent per year) 
• Stock mutual funds 
• Highest risks but also comes with the greatest chance at a high return (10.7 
percent per year) (The Motley Fool, n.d.) 
With this information in mind, it was decided to use a return of seven 
percent for a 401(k). It was also decided to use a return of seven percent for the TSP due 
to the close relatedness to the 401(k).  
Retiring from military service at the 20-year mark and pursuing a civilian 
career becomes more attractive as the expected return increases due to larger 
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contributions to the service members’ investment accounts. The larger amounts are 
attributed to the civilian employer contributing a portion of the employees’ pay to the 
account. For example, if the service members retire from the military at the 20-year mark, 
they will have a total of $10,264 in their 401(k) and TSP account; whereas, they would 
have a total of just $8,059 in their TSP account if they stayed in the military. The 
indifference point between continuing service to their 30-year point and retiring at 20 
years would be if the service member could guarantee a very unlikely return of 19.15 
percent on both their TSP and 401(k) accounts. A sensitivity analysis can be found in 
Appendix A with different 401K returns and the PV of the decision to leave at 20 years. 
8. Social Security 
Social security payments were included to determine accurately at what age the 
prior-enlisted officer could fully retire. To determine what payments the retired officer 
will receive from social security, the retirement website, calculatorsite.com, was used. 
The following information was retrieved for a person collecting benefits starting at age 
60. 
• A salary of under $25,000 will receive $8,000 a year in benefits 
• A salary between $25,000–$40,000 will receive $12,000 a year in benefits 
• A salary of over $40,000 will receive $14,500 a year in benefits (The 
Calculator Site, n.d.) 
Naval officers make more than $40,000 a year in salary; therefore, the $14,500 a 
year for social security benefits was used in this model. 
This model does not allow for any changing of this data.  
9. Life Expectancy 
To retire fully, the service members must plan on being able to support 
themselves until their expected death, which is accomplished through a lifetime of good 
decision making and a certain amount of financial intelligence. The first step is to have a 
baseline for life expectancy. The DoD Office of the Actuary actually conducted some 
research in 2010 to determine the life expectancy of retired military officers and found 
that the average age at which a retired male officer dies is 85. Table 15 has been adapted 
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from this research (Schneeweis, 2011). Based off this information, 85 was used as the life 
expectancy of the prior-enlisted naval officer in this model. 
 
Table 15 Life expectancy of retired military officers 
The model is not designed to change this variable; therefore, any deviations of life 
expectancy are not assumed. The usefulness of the model is thus limited; however, it 
should not have a large effect on the overall findings.  
10. Income Requirement for Full-Time Retirement 
How much money is needed to retire completely? This question needs to be 
answered so it can be applied to this model. In the past, financial experts stated the rule of 
70. This rule of thumb stated that it could be possible to retire once enough cash flow 
from investments have been achieved to be able to maintain 70 percent of the last 
working year salary for the remainder of a person’s life. Today, however, that number 
seems to be a little small. Perhaps this decrease is due to rising health care costs or just 
the rising cost of living. Even some financial experts today say that everyone needs to 
have 135 percent of their final working years’ salary for the rest of their expected life to 
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retire fully. This goal seems to be a little high. In the later years of life, it is expected that 
the amount of bills would be reduced for multiple reasons, house is paid off, less is 
needed for entertainment purposes, children are out on their own, the children’s college 
education has already been paid for, etc. Walter Updegrave from CNN Money states that 
the correct figure to use is still 70 percent–75 percent (Updegrave, 2012). Being a little 
conservative, the slightly higher number of 75 percent is used for this model. 
If the 75 percent is adjusted in this model, the only thing that changes is the age 
an individual can expect to retire. It does not change the PV of the choice to continue 
military service to 30 years or to retire at 20 years. At the current 75 percent figure, the 
service members can expect to retire fully at the age of 66 if they stay in the service for 
20 years verses 60 if they stay in for the full 30 years. If the requirement is raised to the 
135 percent that some financial experts say is required, it increases the full time 
retirement age to 76 for both options. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF MODEL 
Some may argue that these aforementioned numbers, the opportunity cost, do not 
“fully” encompass all the benefits from staying in the Navy from years 20 to 30. When 
people compare the military to civilian wages, they typically say the military wages are 
understated by as much as 50 percent. Understated meaning once all the other benefits 
that the military receives are considered (health insurance, dental insurance, G.I. Bill, 
retirement pay, commissary privileges, tax advantages, etc.), an equivalent “paying” 
civilian job would have to pay that individual an amount 150 percent more than their 
current military pay. Since the decision to retire from the Navy after 20 years of service 
to retiring after 30 years is being examined, many of these differences in pay are invalid 
because the service members have already met the requirement to receive these benefits 
for the remainder of their life. These benefits include the largest, retirement pay, which 
alone is worth over a million dollars (the cumulative retirement cash flows from age 38–




$1,025,928). The only benefits that the individual who retires at 20 years loses compared 
to staying in for 30 years are some tax advantages and the 2.5 percent increase per year in 
retirement pay. 
1. State Income Tax 
While in the military, the service member can claim to be a “resident” of any 
state. Many choose to be a “resident” of one of the nine states that does not collect 
income taxes or one of five states that do not tax military income (RapidTax.com, 2013); 
according to a CNA study conducted in 2006, only 17 percent of military officers pay any 
state tax (Grefer, 2008). Once the service members retire from military service and gains 
civilian employment, they must claim the state in which they actually reside. If their 
residence is in one of the 41 states that does collect income taxes, their pay will be taxed 
and their take home pay will be smaller. If the prior-enlisted officer opts to stop serving 
after 20 years, becomes employed by the civilian sector, and lives in a state that collects 
income tax, that officer can expect to pay $3,418 for the first year of employment to 
$5,148 for the tenth year for a cumulative amount of $42,308 over the course of 10 years 
(assuming starting pay at $67,600 and a 4.66 percent civilian pay raise a year, 5.056 
percent state income tax rate (interpreted from data found online at the tax foundation 
website (Tax Foundation, 2013)). The alternative is serving in the Navy for 10 more 
years and pay $0 in state taxes, which equates to an average of $4,230 per year of tax 
savings. 
2. Federal Income tax 
Nearly the entire civilian paycheck is subjected to federal income taxes; whereas, 
the military only has a portion of its income taxed (base pay). Many other “allowances” 
in the military are not taxed; more specifically, basic allowance for housing (BAH) and 
basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). This tax advantage results in a larger paycheck 
for the service member than an equivalent paying civilian job. In the example of an O-4 
with 20 years of service, the military pay totals $115,127. Included in this figure is base 
pay, BAH, and BAS. Subtracting the BAH and BAS rates from overall pay can provide 
what percentage of a paycheck is actually taxed (average BAH is $26,571 while BAS is 
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$2,911 for the year, which totals $29,482 of non-taxable allowances per year that leaves 
$85,644 of taxable income and a taxable percent of income rate of 74 percent). This 74 
percent rate of taxed income can be used and applied to the 10 years the service member 
can choose to stay on active duty to ascertain the expected federal tax savings. Using a 25 
percent tax rate, a savings of $7,370 the first year is expected up to a savings of $12,066 
for the tenth year for a cumulative value of $94,441 over the course of the 10 years, 
which is an average savings of $9,444 per year. 
3. Is the Model Still Applicable? 
The model does not take these tax savings into consideration, which can add up 
quickly. The first year’s combined tax saving could be as much as $10,788 and a total of 
$136,750 over the course of 10 years. These savings were not included in the model for 
two reasons, 1) It would be too difficult to determine which state’s tax code to use to 
determine the state’s savings amount, and 2) the tax code could change in future years 
that would make 100 percent of the military members pay taxable. By not including the 
tax savings aspects of benefits, a useful tool is thus available to determine if the prior-
enlisted officers are financially better off by staying in the Navy from years 20 to 30. 
Keep in mind that the opportunity cost for leaving the Navy at the 20-year service mark 
that the model returns is slightly understated because it does not include any tax 
advantages (i.e., it “costs” the service member more than the $211,018 to leave the Navy 
after 20 years and seek civilian employment. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, a model was constructed that answers the question whether prior-
enlisted officers are better off financially if they retire from military service after serving 
for 20 or 30 years. The aforementioned variables were used and the PV of all the 
expected cash flows at the age of 61 for both scenarios were compared; serving 20 years 
in the service and seeking civilian employment until able to retire fully versus serving for 
30 years and seeking civilian employment until able to retire fully. If the value were 
negative, which it is given the above variables, the service member would be better off 
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financially by staying in the service for 30 years. The numerical value the model returns 
is the opportunity cost for the service member to depart the service at the 20-year mark. 
∑ of the PV of payments expected for scenario one – ∑ of the PV of payments expected 
for scenario two = Opportunity Cost for departing the service 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In comparing retention rates among prior enlisted officers and non-prior officers 
the findings were significant, and aid in understanding the existing problem. Simply 
stated, prior enlisted officers get out a 310 percent higher rate than non-prior enlisted 
colleagues, despite a steep financial opportunity cost. The premise of this study, and more 
importantly the findings, are important because they address an opportunity for the Navy 
to improve its Officer Corps. By improving retention of prior enlisted officers, the Navy 
can diversify its talent pool and promote the right people, optimizing the desired end state 
of matching talent to task. Men and women are the Navy’s greatest asset, and retaining 
the best and the brightest will always be priority.  
The results of this study, based on a cost benefit analysis and using DMDC data, 
suggest that existing policies disincentivize continued service from prior enlisted officers 
beyond the 20-year point. It is a fact that prior enlisted officers leave the Navy at a 
greater rate than their non-prior enlisted counterparts. The cessation of longevity pay 
raises is one such policy. By terminating E-pay at the O-3 pay grade the Navy no longer 
compensates enlisted experience amongst its Officer Corps. By doing this, the Navy is 
shrinking its pool from which it can draw talent.  
It is without question that service members get out for a myriad of reasons, many 
of which are personal. The research is inconclusive on why prior-enlisted officers get out 
at 20 years but it is indisputable that they get out at greater rate than those without 
enlisted experience. Undoubtedly, officers leave the military service at 20 years, as they 
are able to retire. It remains unanswered as to why, given the fact that they are better off 
financially, to the tune $211,000, to stay in until their 30-year point. It is unknown to 
most officers what the opportunity cost is to getting out at the 20-year point. The benefits 
of 20 years of service are locked in but substantial monetary incentive to stay in still 
exists. 
 50 
The Navy is a hierarchal organization that cannot promote 100 percent of its 
officer corps through the sequential pay grades. Only a select percentage are granted the 
privilege to continue service, although more would likely stay. Maintaining the proper 
manning throughout the various pay grades is daunting, but keeping the right ones is even 
more difficult. By being a hierarchal organization, the Navy is able to retain only top 
performers, but the question remains, is it picking top performers from the largest talent 
pool possible? Based on this study, it is not.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Determine WHY Prior Enlisted Officers Get Out 
It is recommended that further research should be conducted on why prior-
enlisted officers get out at a greater rate than non-prior enlisted officers. Such research 
would provide insight into why service members leave. By knowing why an individual 
leaves military service, the Navy would be able to adapt its future policies to improve 
retention. 
2. Extend “E” Pay through All Pay Grades 
Further research should be conducted on the effects of E pay and its termination at 
the O-4 pay grade. A CBA could conclusively show whether E pay should be continued 
through O-4 to O-6 pay grades. As an expanded study, NMI could be studied as an 
alternative to E pay. This research should seek to synthesize work done by Dr. Gates and 
Professor Myung (2013). 
3. Research Retention Trends Prior to 20-Year Milestone 
This thesis focused on the 20-year point and beyond but did not study trends 
leading up to this career milestone. Further research could examine, in a similar vein, if 
prior-enlisted officers are getting out at a higher rate prior to the 20-year point. If the goal 
is to draw talent from the largest pool possible, this time frame may offer some 
opportunities to expand the pool. 
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4. Target Bonuses to Top Performers, Prior-Enlisted Officers 
More could be done to improve the existing talent pool within the officer corps. 
Bonuses in their current structure are available to all comers regardless of performance. 
This inefficiency promotes mediocrity and lends to talent leakage, as those most capable 
seek reward for their above average performance elsewhere. In today’s fiscally 
constrained environment, every effort needs to be made in getting a bigger bang for the 
buck. 
5. Raise Pension Benefit Percentage 
For every additional year of service beyond 20 years, the Navy increases the base 
pension income of 50 percent by an additional 2.5 percent of the service member’s active 
duty base pay salary, annually. For example, an officer with 25 years of service would 
receive 62.5 percent of active duty base pay (five years beyond 20 years, multiplied by 
2.5 percent yields 12.5 percent). The Navy should make continued service more enticing 
for prior enlisted officers by raising the percentage. The percentage necessary should be 
determined using a CBA and survey data of prior-enlisted officers. 
Great strides have been made in diversifying the Navy in a piece-wise function. 
First, the Navy opened service to African Americans followed shortly thereafter to 
women. Now it has even opened combat roles and is currently exploring the possibilities 
to put females on submarines. The Navy should take the next step to add more diversity 
by ensuring the officer corps is comprised of people with different cultures, Mustangs. 
The Navy spends $29 million dollars for acquiring each F/A-18 Hornet aircraft 
(Naval Air Systems Command, n.d.)). For a similar price, as a result of instating E pay 
through the O-6 pay grade as an example, the Navy could greatly expand its talent pool 
by retaining more prior-enlisted officers, which is but one example of a means to 
reducing the disparity in retention between prior-enlisted officers and non-prior enlisted 
officers. Imagine the unintended benefits of retaining higher quality officers… improved 
enlisted accessions and retention, improved junior officer accession and retention, 
reduced turnover cost, reduced cost resulting from better decision making, and an 
improved war fighting capability, etc. The effects would be profound. 
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401k Returns -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0%
52,000.00$     (320,824.51)$  (321,653.08)$  (322,519.54)$  (323,421.87)$  (324,356.91)$  (325,320.10)$  (326,305.23)$  (327,304.02)$  (328,305.72)$  (329,296.63)$  (330,259.53)$  (331,172.96)$  (332,010.46)$  
57,200.00$     (287,937.75)$  (288,253.57)$  (288,519.39)$  (288,718.14)$  (288,829.08)$  (288,827.20)$  (288,682.40)$  (288,358.62)$  (287,812.78)$  (286,993.60)$  (285,840.15)$  (284,280.28)$  (282,228.70)$  
62,400.00$     (262,941.50)$  (262,744.57)$  (262,409.75)$  (261,904.91)$  (261,191.76)$  (260,224.80)$  (258,950.07)$  (257,303.73)$  (255,210.36)$  (252,581.07)$  (249,311.28)$  (245,278.11)$  (240,337.46)$  
67,600.00$     (230,794.70)$  (230,085.02)$  (229,149.56)$  (227,941.13)$  (226,403.89)$  (224,471.85)$  (222,067.20)$  (219,098.29)$  (215,457.39)$  (211,018.00)$  (205,631.86)$  (199,125.39)$  (191,295.67)$  
72,800.00$     (204,304.18)$  (203,081.75)$  (201,545.64)$  (199,633.63)$  (197,272.29)$  (194,375.18)$  (190,840.60)$  (186,549.13)$  (181,360.69)$  (175,111.20)$  (167,608.71)$  (158,628.94)$  (147,910.15)$  
78,000.00$     (172,650.81)$  (170,915.63)$  (168,778.88)$  (166,163.28)$  (162,977.85)$  (159,115.66)$  (154,451.16)$  (148,837.12)$  (142,101.15)$  (134,041.56)$  (124,422.72)$  (112,969.66)$  (99,361.79)$    
83,200.00$     (141,223.91)$  (138,975.99)$  (136,238.59)$  (132,919.40)$  (128,909.89)$  (124,082.62)$  (118,288.19)$  (111,351.59)$  (103,068.07)$  (93,198.38)$    (81,463.20)$    (67,536.84)$    (51,039.90)$    
88,400.00$     (115,486.80)$  (112,726.13)$  (109,388.09)$  (105,365.32)$  (100,531.71)$  (94,739.36)$    (87,815.01)$    (79,555.84)$    (69,724.79)$    (58,045.00)$    (44,193.47)$    (27,793.81)$    (8,407.80)$      
93,600.00$     (90,058.45)$    (86,785.03)$    (82,846.35)$    (78,119.99)$    (72,462.28)$    (65,704.86)$    (57,650.58)$    (48,068.85)$    (36,690.27)$    (23,200.37)$    (7,232.50)$      11,640.46$      33,915.55$      
98,800.00$     (60,957.33)$    (57,171.16)$    (52,631.84)$    (47,201.89)$    (40,720.09)$    (32,997.60)$    (23,813.39)$    (12,909.09)$    17.03$              15,317.02$      33,401.24$      54,747.50$      79,911.66$      
104,000.00$   (32,029.45)$    (27,730.53)$    (22,590.56)$    (16,457.02)$    (9,151.14)$      (463.56)$          9,850.57$        22,077.43$      36,551.09$      53,661.19$      73,861.75$      97,681.30$      125,734.54$   
109,200.00$   (1,115.82)$      3,695.85$        9,436.46$        16,273.58$      24,403.56$      34,056.22$      45,500.28$      59,049.70$      75,070.89$      93,991.09$      116,308.00$   142,600.85$   173,543.16$   
114,400.00$   21,934.40$      27,258.82$      33,600.07$      41,140.78$      50,094.85$      60,712.58$      73,286.57$      88,158.56$      105,727.29$   126,457.59$   150,890.84$   179,656.99$   213,488.37$   
119,600.00$   54,041.36$      59,878.53$      66,820.43$      75,064.72$      84,842.89$      96,425.69$      110,129.61$   126,324.16$   145,440.42$   167,980.83$   194,530.43$   225,769.87$   262,490.33$   
124,800.00$   80,548.50$      86,898.42$      94,440.96$      103,388.84$   113,991.10$   126,538.98$   141,372.82$   158,889.94$   179,553.73$   203,904.24$   232,570.19$   266,282.93$   305,892.46$   
130,000.00$   106,936.18$   113,798.85$   121,942.03$   131,593.50$   143,019.85$   156,532.81$   172,496.58$   191,336.26$   213,547.59$   239,708.20$   270,490.49$   306,676.53$   349,175.13$   
135,200.00$   133,160.93$   140,536.35$   149,280.18$   159,635.23$   171,885.67$   186,363.71$   203,457.40$   223,619.65$   247,378.52$   275,349.23$   308,247.86$   346,907.21$   392,294.88$   
140,400.00$   160,765.07$   168,653.23$   177,997.70$   189,056.34$   202,130.88$   217,573.99$   235,797.61$   257,282.42$   282,588.82$   312,369.63$   347,384.62$   388,517.26$   436,794.01$   
145,600.00$   186,737.79$   195,138.71$   205,083.82$   216,846.05$   230,744.67$   247,152.87$   266,506.41$   289,313.78$   316,167.73$   347,758.64$   384,889.97$   428,495.91$   479,661.73$   
150,800.00$   216,412.47$   225,326.13$   235,871.89$   248,337.70$   263,060.42$   280,433.69$   300,917.16$   325,047.09$   353,448.57$   386,849.59$   426,097.26$   472,176.50$   526,231.39$   
156,000.00$   243,672.45$   253,098.87$   264,245.27$   277,414.67$   292,961.48$   311,299.82$   332,913.22$   358,365.72$   388,314.73$   423,525.85$   464,889.87$   513,442.41$   570,386.37$   






























































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C. NAVAL OFFICE PAY GRADES/RANKS 
Junior Officers 
O-1  Ensign (ENS) 
O-2 Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) 
O-3 Lieutenant (LT) 
O-4 Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) 
Senior Officers 
O-5 Commander (CDR) 
O-6 Captain (CAPT) 
Flag Ranks 
O-7 Rear Admiral (Lower Half) (RDML) 
O-8 Rear Admiral (Upper Half) (RADM) 
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